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Recent Cases
CIVIL PROCEDURE-COLLATERAL ESTOPPELCONSENT JUDGMENTS
Donohue v. St. Louis Public Service Co.1

Donohue brought an action against defendant for injuries allegedly resulting
from an accident with defendant's bus. Before the case was tried Donohue died
and his widow began an action for wrongful death. To avoid the possibility of
double liability, defendant brought a bill in the nature of interpleader joining
deceased's widow and his personal representative.2 In the interpleader proceeding
the court entered a consent judgment barring further proceedings in the suit for
personal injuries. In the subsequent action for wrongful death, defendant contended
that death resulted from cancer and not the injuries. Judgment was entered for
defendant.
Upon appeal the supreme court reversed, holding that the consent judgment
barring the personal injury action necessarily determined that death was a result of the injuries. Otherwise the personal injury action could not legally be
barred. 8
It is well settled that a consent judgment operates as res judicata to bar a
subsequent action upon the same claim or cause of action the same as a judgment
entered after contest.' The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to those issues
actually litigated and determined, but it also bars litigation of those issues which
might have been raised under the pleadings; i.e., the defendant cannot rely on
defenses which might have been raised in the original action, nor can the plaintiff
1. 374 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 1963).
2. Under Missouri law an action for personal injury does not survive
where the injured party dies as a result of the injury (§ 537.080, RSMo 1959).
If death results from other causes the action for personal injury does survive
(§ 537.020, RSMo 1959). In Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 280 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.
En Banc 1955), the court held that to avoid the possibility of double liability,
a defendant may join the widow and personal representative to determine which
one has the right to proceed against him.
3. Donohue v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 1, at 82.
4. Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, supra note 2; Casler v. Chase, 160 Mo.
418, 60 S.W. 1040 (1901); Short v. Taylor, 137 Mo. 517, 38 S.W. 952 (1897);
Robinson v. Seay, 175 Mo. App. 713, 158 S.W. 409 (1913); Burgess v. Seligman,
107 U.S. 20 (1883); Rector v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 52 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1931);
Cole v. Riss & Co., 16 F.R.D. 263 (W.D. Mo. 1954); First Nat'l Bank v. Burch,
237 Ala. 680, 188 So. 859 (1939); Suttle v. Seely, 94 Ariz. 161, 382 P.2d 570 (1963);
First Nat'l Bank v. Whitlock, 327 Ill. App. 127, 63 N.E.2d 659 (1945); Prawdzik
v. Heidema Bros., 352 Mich. 102, 89 N.W.2d 523 (1958); Third Nat'l Bank v.
Scribner, 370 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1963); See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 514, 521.
Cited as authority contra: Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Janesville Cotton Co., 138 U.S.
552 (1891); Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415 (1874) (allowing equity to reopen
decree to see if it was justified).

(488)
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raise new grounds for recovery on which he might have relied in the original
action. 5
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when a different claim or cause
of action is involved, as in the principal case. The rule of collateral estoppel
only prevents relitigation of those issues actually litigated or determined by the
prior action. 6 It is often difficult to determine what issues were decided in a
contested action, and this problem is even more complex when the judgment is
7
entered by consent.
The majority of the jurisdictions,8 including Missouri,9 accord a consent
judgment the same estoppel effect as a judgment entered after contest. This is
consistent with early United States Supreme Court decisions holding a consent
decree not to be a mere authentication or recording of the agreement, but, rather,
a judicial act of the court 10 In Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. United States,'
a consent decree was held to bar a subsequent suit upon a claim for mail services,
although at the time the decree was entered payment of any claim was prohibited
by law.
This view has been criticized as being unjustly harsh. The argument is that
a party enters into consent judgments for reasons other than the actual merits
of the claim: "smallness of the amount or the value of the property in controversy,
the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evidence, the expense of the litigation,
and his own situation at the time."12 A case which has been criticized 13 as
being particularly harsh is Biggio v. Magee.14 The Massachusetts court entered
a consent judgment between Magee and Biggio's insurer allowing Magee substantial reco-iery. Although Biggio in a later suit produced sufficient evidence
to show liability on the part of Magee, recovery was denied because the prior
consent judgment was held to be an estoppel. The harshness of the result could
5. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 47, 48 (1942).
6. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); RESTATEMENT, JuDGMers §§ 68-70 (1942); Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1942).
7. In re DeChiaro's Estate, 35 Misc.2d 485, 487, 230 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608
(1962).
8. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261 (1885); Pick
Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1935); Wheeler v.
Trefftzs, 39 Cal. Reptr. 507 (1964); Guthrie v. Guthrie, 233 Miss. 550, 102 So.2d
381 (1958); Church v. Vaughn, Hemphill & Co., 182 N.C. 574, 109 S.E. 634 (1921);
Heights Funeral Home v. Mc Clain, 288 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); State
ex. rel. Queen v. Sawyers, 133 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 1963); 50 C.J.S. Judgments
§ 712 (1947); 30A AM. JuR. Judgments § 148 (1958).
9. Short v. Taylor, 137 Mo. 517, 38 S.W. 962 (1897); Owen v. City of
Branson, 305 S.W.2d 492 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957); McDougal v. McDougal, 279
S.W.2d 731 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
10. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944); United States v. Swift & Co.,
286 U.S. 106 (1932); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Last
Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U.S. 683 (1895).
11. Supra note 8, at 266.
12. Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra note 6 at 356.
13. James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. or PA. L.

REV.

173,174 (1959).
14. 272 Mass. 185, 172 N.E. 336 (1930).
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have been avoided had Biggio's insurer received a covenant not to sue and had
the case dismissed without prejudice. This would have protected both the insurer's interests as well as Biggio's. 5
In a situation such as the principal case such hardship is not present. By
allowing the defendant to litigate the issue of cause of death in the wrongful
death action after the personal injury suit was barred, he could avoid liability
for his negligence by inconsistent judgments O The interpleader action was intended
to protect defendants from the possibility of double liability by inconsistent judgment, not from all liability.
With the possible exception of California' 7 and Illinois 8s it would appear
that only the federal courts 'have denied consent judgments collateral estoppel
effect. In United States v. InternationalBldg. Co.' 9 the Supreme Court departed
from its earlier holdings which considered a consent judgment to be a judicial
determination worthy of collateral estoppel effect. 20 Instead, the court held that
absent a showing that the issues raised by the pleadings, were determined either
by the court or that the agreement between the parties was based upon the merits
and not some collateral consideration, collateral estoppel would not apply21
Since the International Bldg. Co. case involved the depreciation basis of a
building for tax purposes, it may be possible to explain the court's holding as a
reluctance to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel -broadly in federal tax
cases. 22 However, the scope of the decision has not been limited to tax cases.
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 140A (1959), provides that a consent
judgment shall not bar an action by the original defendant unless signed by him.
This was necessary since Massachusett's pleading does not provide for counterclaims in an action in tort. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 232, § 1 (1959). Cf.

Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1951); Daniel v. Adorno,
107 A.2d 700 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1954).
16. Donohue v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 1, at 82.
17. Taylor v. Hawkinson, 306 P.2d 797 (1957); but see Wheeler v. Trefftzs,
supra note 8.
18. Hellstrom v. McCollum, 324 Ill. App. 385, 58 N.E.2d 295 (1944). See
also Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., 311 Ky. 745, 225 S.W.2d 315 (1949),
while the court used broad language in denying estoppel effect, the case actually
involved a question of mutuality.
19. 345 U.S. 502 (1935).
20. Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., supra note 10, at 691.
21. United States v. International Bldg. Co., supra note 18, at 506.
22. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948): Sunnen assigned patent
royalties to his wife which she applied to her income tax returns. The Tax Court
found that Sunnen retained sufficient interest in the royalty contracts and control of the income derived from them to justify taxing the income as 'his. An
earlier decision holding the arrangement valid did not work an estoppel in litigation regarding income taxes for different years where decisions of the court have
changed the applicable legal principles in the interim-even though the facts be

similar or identical. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933). Prior decision
allowed corporation to deduct from income an amortized discount on bonds sold
by the corporation's predecessor. In a subsequent action involving like deductions
for later years, the court held the prior judgment worked an estoppel against the
United States. The court ruled that the identical questions were involved: the
language of the Revenue Acts, the regulations issued by the Treasury, and the
facts of the sale of the bonds and successive ownership remained unchanged.
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In Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp, 23 an antitrust action, the court
in applying the InternationalBldg. Co. rule, held that where there had been no
hearing, no stipulation of fact and no showing that the issues were determined by
the court, the judgment had no collateral estoppel effect.24 United States v. Eastport Steamship Corp.25 involved a claim to recover charter hire. It was held
(again relying on the International Bldg. Co. case) that the prior consent judgment was inoperative as an estoppel unless the merits were actually litigated and
determined.Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway27 held that the interpleader proceeding
brought requiring decedent's administrator and widow to interplead and have
the issue of cause of death adjudicated, was an equitable 'proceeding not triable
before a jury. Therefore, in Missouri, a defendant faced with the possibility of
defending a personal injury action and a wrongful death action is left in a difficult position. If the defendant interpleads decedent's administrator and widow
to determine the cause of death, Plaza precludes a jury determination of the issue
in the interpleader proceeding, while Donohue works an estoppel to prevent relitigation of the issue once judgment has been entered in the interpleader proceeding,
even when entered by consent. The result is that by interpleading to avoid the
possibility of double litigation (vexation)28 or double recovery,29 a defendant
gives up the Tight to have a jury determine the cause of death.
LAwRENcE N. KOELN

Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949). The Court held that the
income received from certain oil and gas leases could not be claimed as community property for tax purposes. A prior judgment which permitted the arrangement would not support a plea of estoppel where that judgment was entered
pursuant to written stipulations of the parties. The court said that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is to be applied narrowly in cases involving income taxes
for different years. Tait v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1935). The case
involved facts similar to those in International Bldg. Co. The court held that
the rate for depreciation allowed in one year is not conclusive in fixing the rate
for subsequent years-each case depends upon its own individual facts and evidence. PAUL, Res Juzdicata in Federal Taxation, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL
TAxATiON (2d ser.) 104 (1938); Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax Cases,
46 YALE L. J. 1320 (1937); Annot., 92 L.Ed. 913 (1947).
23. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp. 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954),
rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 322 (1955).
24. Id. at 935.
25. United States v. Eastport Steamship Corp., 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958).
26. Id. at 801; Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324 (10th Cir.
1948).
27. Downs v. United Rys., 184 S.W. 995 (Mo. 1916).
28. Harris v. Goggins, 374 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
29. Supra note 2, at 24. For a possible solution, see dissenting opinion, at 26.
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EVIDENCE-UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURESCOPE OF EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc.;

Plaintiff sued defendant bus company on the theory of res ipsa loquitur
for injuries received when the bus in which he was riding ran off an embankment
after colliding with an oncoming automobile. The driver of the automobile was
killed in the accident. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court committed error by
allowing defendant's expert to testify that a blood sample drawn from the body
of the deceased automobile driver indicated that he was intoxicated. This evidence
tended to rebut 'the res ipsa presumption and to establish the negligence of the
other driver as the cause of the accident. Plaintiff argued that ".

.

. said evidence

was incompetent because obtained by the unlawful desecration of a dead body
amounting to an unconstitutional search and seizure, repugnant to common ideas
of decency"2 and that "those who participated in this procedure were guilty of a
crime, and the use of the data obtained was against public policy; that only
evidence lawfully obtained may be adduced." 3 The court held the evidence was
competent and admissible.
As a general proposition, the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
means through which it was obtained 4 unless obtained by a search and seizure
in violation of constitutional guarantees.5 But even where the search and seizure
has violated the constitution, the right to complain is personal to the party so
aggrieved.0
The rationale underlying the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unlawful
search and seizure and its operation as an exclusionary rule of evidence is rooted
in the principles of 18th century "natural law" and "natural rights." John Locke
and his contemporary liberal philosophers, upon whom the framers of the American
Constitution relied so heavily, held the view that every man has the "natural
right" to be secure in his home and person.7 Furthermore, since harsh and tyrannical government was the chief invader of this right, Locke and others directed their
proposals toward the restraint of governmental action. Traditionally, therefore, the
Fourth Amendment prohibition has been held to apply only to searches and
seizures involving state action."
It is from this background that two kinds of cases have emerged as being
1. 378 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1964).
2. Brief for Respondent, p. 4, id.
3. Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., s.rpra note 1, at 511.

4. 8 WiOMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2183 (3d ed. 1940); 31A C.J.S. EVIDENCE § 187

(1964); Streipe v. Hubbuch Bros. & Wellendorf, 25 S.W.2d 358 (Ky. 1930); Plater
v. W. C. Mullins Constr. Co., 223 Mo. App. 650, 17 S.W.2d 658 (K.C. Ct. App.
1929)5. See development
in note 8, infra.
6. See notes 24, 25, infra.
7. MASON & LEAA,

IN QUEST OF FREEDoM 12 (1959); KELLEY & HARBIsoN,

THE AMERICAN CONSrtrrloN 96 (1955).
8. Sackler v. Sackler, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962); State v. Wilkerson, 159
S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1942).
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within the scope of the exclusionary rule: (1) criminal cases,9 since the direct
action of the state against the individual is the heart of the controversy, and (2)
certain forfeiture proceedings,10 since while they are civil in form they are criminal
in nature."Most courts have refused to extend the exclusionary rule to purely civil cases,
and, while there have been recent allusions to the applicability of the rule to
civil suits 12 there is little authority in point. Furthermore, the cases inaccurately
draw the line between civil and criminal proceedings, when the real distinction
appears to be the presence or absence of the proscribed state action.
Some judges have applied the exclusionary rule to civil cases, and have done
so even where there is no state action involved. They argue that "the unlawful
search violates the identical privacy, whether its fruits are used to convict in a
criminal prosecution or to forfeit a personal right in a divorce action,"'1 and that
"here we deal not with criminal sanctions, but constitutional guarantees granted
to the individual to be secure in his home. The balance to be maintained between
morality and law must be tipped in favor of that consideration resting on our
fundamental law."14 This approach seems to ignore the historical development of
the unlawful search and seizure doctrine just as much as the civil-criminal distinction.
Wigmore supports general admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in both
civil and criminal actions. He contends that for reasons of justice and expediency
it is simply not worth the time and trouble to make an issue of the collateral
matter of how the evidence was obtained. Its admission does not condone policestate tactics; rather, the illegality is merely ignored in the particular litigation.
Moreover, the aggrieved party still has other means of redress available.5
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Mo. Co NsT. art I, § 15; Streipe v.
Hubbuch Bros. & Wellendorf, supra note 4; Plater v. W. C. Mullins Constr. Co.,
supra note 4; 31A CJ.S. Evidence, supra note 4.
10. De Reuil, Applicability of the Fouarth Anendment In Civil Cases, 1963

DuKE L.J. 472; Boyd v. United States, supra note 9.
11. 31A CJ.S. EvmENcE, supra note 4.

12. See dissenting opinions in Sackler v. Sackler, supra note 8 (estranged
husband led "raid" on wife's apartment and obtained evidence of her adultery subsequently admitted in divorce action), noted in 48 CORNELL L.Q. 345 (1963), and in
8 UTAH L. REv. 84, 87 (1962). See also Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93
N.W.2d 281 (1958), and Rocco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 38 Misc.2d 43 (1963).
13. Sackler v. Sackler, supra note 8, at 68. See also Lebel v. Swincicki, supra
note 12.

14. Sackler v. Sackler, supra note 8, at 69.

15. 8 WioioRa, EvIDENCE, supra note 4, at 6:

As a general rule, our legal system does not attempt to do justice incidentally and to enforce penalties by indirect means. A judge does not [71
attempt, in the course of a specific litigation, to investigate and punish all
offenses which incidentally cross the path of the litigation. Such a practice
would offend our system of law in several ways. (1) It amounts to trying
a violation of law without the proper complaint and process which are
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1
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 33.03(a) is directly aimed at state action, '

and, in applying the exclusionary principle to criminal cases, the courts of this
state have apparently followed the civil-criminal distinction. In Diener, however,
the Missouri Supreme Court implies that it would have been willing to exclude
evidence on the grounds of illegal search and seizure in a civil case, had there
been state action and had plaintiff standing to raise the issue. If this is correct,
the clearly worded Rule 33.03 (a) providing for exclusion in a criminai case when
the evidence is seized by a peace officer could become a minimum, standard of protection. The court would be free to expand it by opinion whenever state action is
involved, regardless of whether the case is civil or criminal.
Another feature of the current Missouri rule which could limit its expansion
is the provision that the evidence must be seized by a peace officer. How broad
is this term? In Diener it was the coroner's "hireling" who took the blood, and a
1
Missouri coroner does have some duties as a "Conservator of the Peace." ' The
gist of the statutes relating to the coroner' seems to be, however, that while
he does possess certain authority of a police nature in the absence or at the request of the sheriff, his duties relating to inquests are a separate 'facet of 'his responsibility. The taking of the blood sample is not related to his duties as a conservator of the peace.
Another limitation on the exclusionary rule of evidence is that the right to be
free from unconstitutional searches and seizures is a personal right. Only persons
who are "aggrieved"' 9 may complain; those merely prejudiced by the use of evidence illegally seized from another may not.20 Other cases say that the right to
essential for its correct investigation. (2) Determination of incidental violations jeopardizes the primary litigation by delaying, interrupting, confusng and sometimes frustrating it. (3) It does all of this unnecessarily
and gratuitously; the persons harmed .by the supposed incidental violations
have direct means of redress available and should not be allowed to attend to their complaints in this indirect and possibly tardy manner. (4)
The judicial rules of evidence were never meant to be used as an indirect
method of punishment. To punish the incidental violation by rendering
evidence obtained thereby inadmissible in the primary litigation is to enlarge improperly the fixed penalty of the law, that of fine or imprisonment,
by adding to it the forfeiture of some civil right through loss of the means
of proving it.
16. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 33.03(a):
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure made by a peace
officer and against whom there is pending any criminal proceeding growing out of the subject matter of the said search and seizure, may file in
the court in which such proceeding is pending, a motion to suppress the
use in evidence of the articles taken by means of such seizure and any evidence gained by the peace officers by means of such search." (Emphasis
added.)
17. § 58.180, RSMo 1959.
18. §§ 58.180, 58.155, 58.190, 58.200, 544.120, 544.140, RSMo 1959.
19. FED. R. CRnvm. P. 41(e); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261; Mo.
Sup. CT. R. 33.03(a), supra note 16.
20. 77 N.J. Super. 328, 186 A.2d 499 (1962) (abortionist sought to invoke the
privilege against the admission of the results of an examination of the victim on
the grounds that her constitutional guaranty had been violated.).
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assert the protection is held only by persons with a proprietary interest in the
22
articles seized2l or by persons owning or in possession of the premises searched.
The Missouri Supreme Court held in Diener that plaintiff had no standing to raise
the illegal search and seizure issue. "There is no . . .relationship between plaintiff
and McNamee [the deceased driver] which would entitle plaintiff to raise the
question of a violation of constitutional guarantees enjoyed by McNamee. ' 23 The
court's statement suggests, however, that although the right is personal to the
actual victim of the search and seizure, perhaps the next of kin or personal representative of a deceased victim might have standing to challenge the evidence.
Plaintiff's vague objection also suggested a relationship between unconstitutional search and seizure and (1) the right of privacy and (2) a property interest
in the body of McNamee. The court relied on Fretz v. Anderson 24 in saying "'The
right of privacy is a personal one which in the absence of statute dies with the
person to whom it is of value and cannot be claimed by his estate or next of kin' 25
or by a stranger. ' 26 Regarding the "property interest" contention, the court noted
that plaintiff and McNamee were strangers and that plaintiff had no interest in
the body which would allow him to complain of its mutilation or desecration.
Inferentially, a relative or personal representative could have successfully asserted
this argument 2 since it is generally accepted that there are quasi-property rights
28
in a corpse which belong to the proper parties.
Plaintiff objected also on the ground that "There was no evidence ...that
the coroner's hireling who took the blood . . . did so with the consent of the next
of kin, at the lawful direction of any responsible public officer or in accordance
with any lawfully established procedure."29 In answering this the court merely
said that the record was "silent" on the question of whether the doctor had the
consent of the next of kin to draw the blood,30 which apparently means that
plaintiff had at least the burden of going forward with evidence that the procedure
was in fact unlawful, a burden which he did not sustain.31
21. State v. Easter, 174 Neb. 412, 424, 118 N.W.2d 515, 523 (1962).
22. State v. Engberg, 377 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. 1964); State v. Martin, 347
S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1961); State v. Askew, 331 Mo. 684, 56 S.W.2d 52 (1932).
23. Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., supra note 1, at 511.
24. 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642 (1956).
25. Id. at 296, 300 P.2d at 646.
26. Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., supra note 1.
27. But see, Streipe v. Hubbuch Bros. & Wellendorf, supra note 4, which held
that there is no right of property, in the usual sense, in a body, that a corpse is not
a "possession" within the contemplation of the constitutional guaranty, and that
an autopsy performed without consent of the next of kin was not an "unreasonable
search and seizure."
28. Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 150 S.W.2d 489, 493 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941); 15
AM. JUR. Dead Bodies §§ 6, 35; 25 C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2.
29. Brief for Respondent, p. 8, Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., supra
note 1.
30. Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., supra note 1.
31. The court in State v. Hepperman, 162 S.W.2d 878, 887 (Mo. 1942), citing
20 AM. JuR. Evidence § 396 (1939) stated, ". . the burden is on the [party opposing the admission] to offer evidence and affirmatively demonstrate the illegality of
the search and seizure." This suggests that the opponent may even have the burden
of persuasion.
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The decision in Diener is sound for several reasons: (1) There was no evidence of the illegality of the search and seizure; (2) Plaintiff's constitutional right
was not violated; (3) There was no relationship between the plaintiff and the
victim of the search and seizure which would permit him to complain; (4) The
victim's relatives were not complaining; (5) It is a civil case. The importance of
the case, however, is that the court did not base its decision on the distinction
between civil and criminal cases. This is better analysis since the real basis of the
exclusionary rule lies in the historical concept of natural rights abridged by state
action, regardless of the nature of the suit.
MICHAEL A. LANDRuM

TORTS-DUTY OF POSSESSOR OF LAND TO FIREMEN
Bartels v. Continental Oil Co.1
George Bartels, a captain in the Kansas City, Missouri fire department, was
in a Kansas City, Kansas street 2 fighting a gasoline fire on defendant's property,
when one of its inadequately vented storage tanks exploded and rocketed into the
street, engulfing him in a ball of fire. Plaintiffs recovered in a wrongful death
action, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported a finding of existence of hidden danger known to the possessor and failure
to warn the fireman of a danger which he was not bound to accept as a usual peril
of his profession.
In cases like Bartels, where the issue is the negligence of a possessor of land,
the extent of the duty owed depends on whether the injured person was a trespasser,s licensee, 4 or invitee.r Most public officials acting in performance of their
duties have been classed as invitees, but the place of firemen (and policemen)
in the traditional scheme of classification has caused considerable difficulty.
1. 384 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1964).
2. Brief for Appellant, p. 16, Bartels v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 1.
3. One who is on another's land without the possessor's consent or a privilege
to be there. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 329 (1934).
4. One privileged to be on the land for his own benefit by virtue of the
possessor's consent. Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1 (En Banc
1909); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 330 (1934); RESTATEMENT (Second), TORTS § 330
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
5. One invited or permitted to be on the land for either the possessor's or
their mutual economic benefit. Glaser v. Rothschild, supra note 4; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 332 (1934); RESTATEMENT (Second), TORTS § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1960). For historical analysis see Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. REv.
725, 735 (1937); Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 142, 237, 340 (1921); McCleary,
The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the
Land, 1 Mo. L. REv. 45 (1936). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 27.1.14 (1956); PRossER, TORTS §§ 58-61 (3d ed. 1964).
6. E.g., Jennings v. Industrial Paper Stock Co., 248 S.W.2d 43 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1952) (public health inspector); Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S.W.2d
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Obviously firemen coming onto the land in the performance of their duties
are not trespassers. Missouri 7 follows the majority rule that they are licensees.$
Until recently when the Illinois case of Dini v. Naiditc treated firemen as invitees, 9 only special fact situations warranted invitee status. 0 Some states consider
them sui generis.21
The majority view is the result of starting with the duty the court feels the
landowner owes firemen and working back to the category that prescribes that
duty. Because firemen are 'privileged to be anywhere on the premises at any time,
the duty owed invitees, to use reasonable care to keep the premises safe or warn of
dangers present,12 would exist at all times and include the entire premises. The
possessor has little opportunity to prepare for firemen since they come in emergencies and at unexpected times and places, so most courts say that invitee
status would put an overly severe burden on the possessor. 8 Many also point out
that because firemen enter under a privilege given by law they are not invited
in the legal sense and so they cannot be invitees."' The only category left is that

369 (1936) (postman); Boneau v. Swift & Co., 66 S.W.2d 172 (St. L. Mo. App.
1934) (livestock inspector); Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189, 196
So. 472 (1940) (building inspector); Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 69 Ga. App. 41,
24 S.E.2d 834 (1943) (meter reader); Toomey v. Sanborn, 146 Mass. 28, 14 N.E.
921 (1888) (garbage collecter).
7. Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (En Banc 1955).
8. Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac.
459 (1910); 'Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203
(1910); Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (1959); Baxley v.
Williams Construction Co., 98 Ga. App. 662, 106 S.E.2d 799 (1958); Woodruff v.
Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E. 1113 (1893); Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121,
131 Atl. 44 (1925); Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d
1008 (1936); Eckert v. Refiners Oil Co., 17 Ohio App. 221 (1923); Beehler v.
Daniels, 18 R.I. 563, 29 Atl. 6 (1894); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v.
O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). See Annots., 86 A.L.R.2d 1205
(1962), 141 A.L.R. 584 (1942), 13 A.L.R. 637 (1921). The origin and explanation
of the rule are explained in Comment, 35 MicH. L. Rnv. 1157 (1937).
9. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
10. Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W.2d 892 (1954)
(fireman delivering and installing sump pump); Clinkscales v. Mundkoski, 183
Okla. 12, 79 P.2d 562 (1938) (private citizen pressed into service outside city
limits); Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922)
(fireman outside city limits).
11. Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964); Smith
v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 83 N.H. 439, 144 Atl. 57 (1928); Krauth v.
Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960); Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229
N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920); Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232
Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951). See Annots., supra note 8.
12. E.g., Milliken v. Trianon Hotel Co., 364 S.W.2d 71 (K.C. Mo. App.
1962); Daggs v. Patsos, 260 S.W.2d 794 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Zuercher v.
Northern Jobbing Co., sutpra note 10; REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 343 (1934). See
generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 27.12-.14 (1956); PIossER, ToRTs
§ 61 (3d ed. 1964).
13. E.g., Anderson v. Cinnamon, rspra note 7; Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper
Products Co., supra note 11; Beehler v. Daniels, supra note 8.
14. E.g., Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra note 7; Lunt v. Post Printing &
Publishing Co., supra note 8 (it is not an invitation even if the possessor turns
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of licensee; therefore firemen are licensees. 15
Once firemen are classed as licensees, all that remains is to apply the duty
owed in the particular jurisdiction to the facts. The Restatement of Torts view is
that the possessor owes a duty to warn or make safe as to known dangerous
conditions which the licensee is not likely to discover. 8 Missouri 'has never adopted
this view, following instead the majority view that the licensee takes the premises
as he finds them, the possessor's only duty being not to injure him by willful and
wanton misconduct or active negligence."7
The result under either view can be admittedly harsh.' 8 As might be expected,
the courts have developed ways of giving firemen more protection. One way is
to treat firemen sui generis and require duties not necessarily incident to any
particular status. 19 Another, in effect, treats firemen as invitees when they are
rightfully using the approaches that are prepared and kept open as a means of
20
access to the property for those entitled to enter.
The Bartels case involves the hidden dangers doctrine, a widely recognized
addition to the duty owed licensees. Stated simply, where the possessor knows the
fireman is on the premises and has the opportunity, he has a duty to warn
of known hidden dangers the licensee is unlikely to discover.21
In cases in other jurisdictions involving injury to firemen, hidden dangers
have included oil saturated soil,22 stored benzol, 2 3 seeping gasoline in a closed
room, 24 a recently drained gasoline storage tank, 25 an inadequately vented gasoline
in the alarm); Woodruff v. Bowen, supra note 8; Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., supra note 8; Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., supra note 11.
15. It is beyond the scope of this note to evaluate the arguments. For criticism see 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.14; 47 CORNELL L.Q. 119, 121 (1961).
16. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 345 (1934) covers persons entering in the exercise of a privilege independent of the possessor's consent. Comment b makes
the duty owed to them the same as that owed a licensee, which is covered in
§ 342. Cf. RESTATEMENT (Second), TORTS § 345 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960), retaining this and adding the rule of the Mejers case, supra note 11. For statement
of the Meiers rule see text referred to at note 20, infra.
17. E.g., Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra note 7; Twine v. Norris Grain Co.,
226 S.W.2d 415 (K.C. Mo. App. 1950) and citations therein; Porchey v. Kelling,
353 Mo. 1034, 185 S.W.2d 820 (1945) (wherein the doctrine is said to be the
majority rule).
18. E.g., Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693
(1899).
19. The cases indicate the duty owed lies somewhere between that owed to a
licensee and that owed an invitee. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 11. But see 5
VAND. L. REv. 248, 249 (1952) where it is said to lie between that owed to a
trespasser and that owed a licensee, and 47 CORNELL L.Q. 119, 122 (1961) to the
effect that no new standard of care has been imposed.
20. Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, supra note 11.
21. "Hidden danger" is not the same as "dangerous condition." See Annot.,
55 A.L.R.2d 525 (1957) for collection of cases.
22. Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 723, 194 Atl. 873 (1937).
23. Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, 108 Ohio St. 377, 140 N.E. 770
(1923).
24. Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E.2d 503 (1940).
25. James v. Cities Service Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 87, 31 N.E.2d 872 (1939).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 7

1965]

RECENT CASES

storage tank, 26 escaping gas, 2 7 the presence of explosives, 28 and significantly, a
structurally defective wall.29 On the other hand, an open elevator well,30 a split
acetone container,31 an open excavation,3 2 stacked containers of petroleum
products, 3 3 and the mere presence of gasoline3 4 have not been considered hidden
dangers.
Missouri's leading case on firemen, Anderson v. Cinnamon,3 5 recognized this
doctrine, but it was the court's opinion that
it is unusual hazard that requires warning to licensees. Harmful chemicals, explosives and other inherently dangerous materials developed by
modern science and industry, no doubt, would be within this rule at least
under circumstances where licensees could not be expected to know of
their presence or effect. 36
The injury in that case resulted from a structurally defective porch. In
denying recovery, the court said "we do not think the rule requiring warning
in the case of unusual hazard from explosives should be applied to the same extent to structural conditions generally.137 This language is important in discussing
the Bartels case.
The law of Kansas, where Bartels was injured,3s controlled. s0 Kansas had
never decided this question, so the Missouri court applied the general rules of
status and the 'possessor's duty.40 Since Missouri is in accord with these rules,4 1
the result would probably be the same in a case controlled by Missouri law.
Plaintiffs contended that because the fireman was off the premises his status
was unimportant, - but the court did not answer this argument, proceeding to
discuss law applicable to injuries occurring on the land. Thus it would seem this
decision would apply in the usual case where the injury does occur on the land.
Anderson held a structurally defective porch was not an ianusuas hazard;
26. Lamb v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 362, 3 N.E.2d 686 (1935).
27. Smith v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., supra note 11.
28. Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc., supra note 11.
29. Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., s-upra note 11.
30. Beehler v. Daniels, supra note 8.
31. Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 206 A.2d 148 (1965).
32. Baxley v. Williams Construction Co., supra note 8.
33. Rogers v. Cato Oil & Grease Co., 396 P.2d 1000 (1964).
34. Wax v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n., 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W.2d 707
(1951); Gannon v. Royal Properties, Inc., 285 App. Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1954); Eckert v. Refiners Oil Co., supra note 8.
35. Supra note 7, noted with Nastasio v. Cinnamon, 295 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.
1956) in Stapleton, Liability of Possessor of Premises to Fireman Injured Thereon,
23 Mo. L. REv. 69 (1958).
36. Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra note 7, at 308, 282 S.W.2d at 448.
37. Id. at 310, 282 S.W.2d at 449.
38. Supra note 2.
39. E.g., Knight v. Swift & Co., 338 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1960); Boneau v.
Swift & Co., 66 S.W.2d 172 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934).
40. Bartels v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 1, at 669.
41. Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra note 7; Porchey v. Kelling, supra note 17.
42. Brief for Respondent, pp. 18-24, Bartels v. Continental Oil Co., supra
note 1. Some support is found in Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., supra note 22, at
725-26, 194 At. at 875 and in Krauth v. Geller, 54 N.J. Super. 442, 458, 149 A.2d
271, 279 (1959).
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Bartels held an inadequately vented gasoline storage tank was a hidden danger.
In comparing the two, it is clear that the Bartels result is within the Anderson
language. The real importance of the case lies in a comparison of the language
used in each case-previously defined terms of art meaning different things,
the use of which suggests that Bartels enlarges a possessor's duty.
If Bartels were the first case on the subject it could be argued that the outcome of the case was more important than the words used to achieve it, and
therefore not too much should be inferred from semantic differences. Similarly, if
it were not a major point it could be argued that precise language is not to be
expected on collateral matters. In both cases, however, the question was directly
in issue; thus the words can be taken as having been carefully chosen in awareness
of their implications.
The court in Anderson treated "hidden danger" and "unusual hazard" as
having different meanings, the former apparently being broader. Thus if a court
chose to say a possessor must warn of hidden dangers, and at the same time
rejected the phrase "unusual hazard," it would be reasonable to suppose many
things would be included in the former that would not logically be included in
the latter. Whether the difference is one of kind or degree is not so important
here as the fact that there is a difference.
In deciding Bartels, the court, having before it the "unusual hazard" test of
Anderson, spoke throughout of "hidden dangers." Independent of the facts of
either case, it is reasonable to suppose a reason for the change, especially when
consistent language would be desirable if no difference were intended.
Turning now to the cases, there can be no doubt that "harmful chemicals,
explosives, and other inherently dangerous materials" can reasonably include
gasoline. Substituting terms, Anderson then characterized gasoline as an unusual
hazard. Having once called it one thing, why should the court later call it something else? The change was not required; if the court wanted to limit itself to
the earlier dictum, it could have used the unusual hazard test and still affirmed
the judgment. Having used broader language, the court may have intended a
broader test; one that would encompass structural defects.
Further support for this conclusion comes from comparing the way the Missouri Supreme Court in each case used Skyputiski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co.,
which held a structurally defective wall to be a hidden danger.43 In Anderson, the
case was cited and distinguished on its facts.44 Yet in Bartels, it was quoted approvingly for the proposition that it makes little sense not to require the possessor to give a warning, when he can do so, that could alert firemen to hidden
dangers that might injure them.4 5 Besides there being a structural defect in the
Skypulski case, if this is a part of the court's reasoning, it is equally applicable
whether firemen are likely to be engulfed in a ball of fire or fall through a defective porch. Thus Anderson could be decided differently today.
Regardless of the accuracy of the analysis, the shift in terms casts sufficient
43. Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., supra note 11.
44. Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra note 7, at 310, 282 S.W.2d at 449.
45. Bartels v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 1, at 670.
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doubt on the law to be a factor in settlements and litigation. If the analysis is
correct, the possessor in Missouri now has a duty to warn firemen of known
structural defects that are unlikely to be discovered, provided he knows the firemen are present and has an opportunity to warn them. This writer hopes the
analysis is correct. It is a step toward a society that requires men always to deal
with one another reasonably, regardless of either's status.
RoNAL.D E. SMULL

TORTS-TRESPASS-IMMUNITY OF STATE'S INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR
Rector v. Tobin Construction Co.Defendant construction company, which was under contract with the State
Highway Commission to build a bridge across a nonnavigable, natural watercourse,
constructed within the right of way an earthen fill across the bed of the
stream to be bridged. The fill's height was approximately seven feet and a
metal drain pipe three feet in diameter ran through the fill parallel with the stream
permitting the normal flow of the stream to pass through. Heavy rain then occurred and plaintiff's farm land was flooded damaging his crops. This action was
brought to recover double damages under Section 236.270, RSMo 1959 which
provides that a person who obstructs a watercourse to the damage of another must
forfeit to the injured party double damages. The trial court rendered judgment
for defendant. The court of appeals2 reversed and remanded for a new trial finding
defendant trespassed. The supreme court s agreed that the evidence was sufficient
to support a charge of trespass q.c.f., but found for defendant.
The court based its decision on the following rule found in a 1953 volume of
C.J.S. concerning the liability of a contractor working for the state: 'here
he
[the independent contractor] performs his work in accordance with plans and
specifications and is guilty of neither negligence nor wilful tort, he is not liable for
any damage that might result."4 The court decided that trespass q.c.f. is not a
wilful tort and since defendant contractor was not negligent he could not be
liable. If the contractor had been negligent, he would have been -held liable for
the injuries which resulted; but since he committed the more flagrant intentional
tort of trespass, he was not liable. If a person working under contract with the
state is held liable for negligent acts then surely he should also 'be held liable for
intentional acts of trespass; however, the above rule has lead the Missouri Supreme
Court to a contrary result.
1.
2.
3.
4.

377 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
Rector v. Tobin Construction Co., 351 S.W.2d 816 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
Supra note 1, at 414 the two torts are distinguished.
81 C.J.S. States § 131, 1144-1145 (1953).
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The original source of the rule is the case of Ference v. Booth & Flinn Co. 5
decided in 1952 which cites 40 C.J.S. Highways section 212 (1944) as authority.
This section says "The contractor, and not the highway authority, is liable for
damages resulting from his own tortious acts in the performance of the contract,
as where he is negligent, or commits an unauthorized trespass on the property
off the right of way." The Ference case took this 1944 rule and mistakenly paraphrased it by substituting the words "wilful tort" for unauthorized trespass.8
C.J.S. in 1953 cited this new rule stated in Ference and inserted it under States
in volume 81 and the Missouri Supreme Court adopted it as the basis for its
decision in the instant case.
The earlier 1944 C.J.S. rule7 finding a contractor liable for negligence and
trespass is overwhelmingly supported by American cases. As was stated in Rector
a contractor is liable for negligence; 8 however, contrary to our court all other
jurisdictions with the exception of Pennsylvania, which continues to follow their
anachronistic rule of Ference v. Boot& & Flinn Co.,9 hold a contractor liable for
his trespass in performance of work for the state.10 Some states have gone even
further than the majority of jurisdictions by holding the State Highway Commission liable for the trespass of independent contractors working for the commission. 1 Surely an independent contractor employed by a state should not 'be
afforded more immunity from tort actions than a State Highway Commission
which is a recognized agency of the state and therefore is normally considered
immune to suits without its consent. The logical effect of this Missouri case will
be to permit contractors working under contract with the state to trespass with
impunity but not permit them to be negligent. This inconsistency can only lead
to confusion as to the liability of a contractor working for the state of Missouri.
Another interesting question which arises
fendant actually committed a trespass, as the
supreme court 8 agreed. Under the law as it
flooding of streams caused by an obstruction,

in this case is whether or not decourt of appeals12 decided and the
now stands in Missouri as to the
defendant was clearly liable as a

5. 370 Pa. 400, 403, 88 A.2d 413, 414 (1952).
6. Supra note 1, at 414.
7. 40 CJ.S. Highways § 212, 208-209 (1944).

8. Sa pra note 1, at 413.
9. Supra note 5.
10. Kochtitshy v. Bond, 128 Ark. 255, 194 S.W. 8 (1917); Timothy J. Foohey
Dredging Co. v. Mabin, 118 Ark. 1, 175 S.W. 400 (1915); Hall v. Ellis & Brantley,
238 Ky. 114, 36 S.W.2d 850 (1931); Nelson v. Babcock, 188 Minn. 584, 248 N.W.
49 (1933); Konner v. State, 227 N.Y. 478, 125 N.E. 843 (1920); Little v. Robert
G. Lassiter & Co., 156 S.C. 286, 153 S.E. 128 (1930); Austin Road Co. v. Anderson, 146 Tex. 553, 209 S.W.2d 595 (1948).
11. Marbury v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 153 So. 590 (La. 1934); Murff
v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 19 La. App. 847, 140 So. 863 (1932); Nelson v.
Babcock, supra note 10.
12. Rector v. Tobin Construction Co., supra note 2, at 821: "The flooding of
another's land by blocking a stream constitutes a trespass."
13. Rector v. Tobin Construction Co., supra note 1, at 414: "
the non
negligent intentional construction 'by the defendant resulted in harm to the
plaintiff in a way sufficient to support a charge of trespass q.c.f."
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trespasser q.c.f.;14 but the correctness of the Missouri courts application of the

law of trespass to the area of flooding is confused.
The Restatement of Torts's defines a trespasser as "one who intentionally and
without a consensual or other privilege enters land in the possession of another
or any part thereof or caused a thing or third person so to do." In comment h

following this definition it is pointed out that in causing a thing to enter the
land of another it is not necessary in order to ,be a trespasser that the foreign

matter be thrown directly upon the other's land. "It is enough that an act is
done which will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of foreign matter."18
However, the resulting entry of foreign matter must be immediately and directly
occasioned 'by the act of the trespasser and not merely a consequence resulting
from the complained of act. 7 The application of the distinction between consequential and immediate injury is where Missouri courts differ from most other
courts in the area of obstructed water courses.' 8

This distinction between immediate and consequential invasion of one's property rights is clearly stated in the case of Suter v. Wenatchee Water Power Co.19

Here the defendant built a canal prior to 1899 to carry irrigation water which
overflowed and damaged plaintiff on June 10, 1900.
14. Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959). Accord,
Bell v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, 367 S.W.2d 812 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963);
Rector v. Tobin Construction Co., supra note 2.
15. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 158 (1934).
16. Ibid.
17. 52 AM. JUR. Trespass § 2 (1944).
18. Roundtree v. Brantley, 34 Ala. 544 (1858):
But trespass has, in the law, a well ascertained and fixed meaning. It
refers to injuries which are immediate and not consequential. It would be
a perversion of language to denominate an act, which produced a consequential injury, a trespass.
Holly v. Boston Gaslight Co., 8 Gray (Mass.) 123, 130, 69 Am. Dec. 233, 235
(1853):
If a person pour water on my land, the injury is immediate; but if he
stops up a watercourse on his own land . . . in consequence of which
water afterwards runs therefrom into my land, the injury is consequential,
and will not render the act itself a trespass.
Above taken from CHIry, PLEADINGS (6th ed. 1851) at 146. Hicks v. Drew,
117 Cal. 305, 309, 49 Pac. 189, 190 (1897):
One of the best tests by which to distinguish trespass is found in the
answer to the question, when was the damage done? If the damage does
not come directly from the act, but is simply an after result from the
act, it is essentially consequential, and no trespass.
Although the court proposes the test of asking when the damages were done,
it would have been more accurate to ask when the wrong occurred since this is
the way the court applied the test. The determining factor in deciding whether
an action of trespass q.c.f. or trespass on the case is proper is whether the wrong
occurs immediately upon the doing of the act and not whether the damages occur
immediately. For an example of the wrong occurring immediately but the damages
later and discussion of the problem see Arvidson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 125 F.
Supp. 48 (W.D. Wash. 1954). See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 447 (1953) for comprehensive treatment of liability for floods caused by debris.
19. 35 Wash. 1, 76 Pac. 298 (1904).
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Such injury so resulting must necessarily have been consequential, and
not the direct result of wrongful force applied to the respondents
Eplaintiff's] lands, as must have been true to create a trespass. "It is not
trespass to flow the lands of another with water by erecting a dam below
his land, for any one may lawfully build a dam on his land, and the act
-being injurious only in consequences, is to be redressed by an action on
the case."2 0
Thus this case, as most American cases, distinguishes between immediate and
consequential wrongs and concludes if the invasion is not immediate then the
action of trespass as distinguished from trespass on the case can not be maintained.
However, in Missouri as exemplified by the instant case this distinction is not
made concerning obstructed water courses.
In the present case 21 the contractor built the fill and allowed the usual flow
of water to proceed by inserting a drainage pipe three feet in diameter parallel
with the stream. Therefore, the occurance of the flood which damaged plaintiff
was not substantially certain to happen as a direct result of the contractor's act.
In addition the flooding did not occur directly upon the building of the fill but,
on the contrary, only after heavy rains occurred. The flooding, therefore, was
merely a latter consequence of defendant's act so an action of trespass on the case
and not trespass q.c.f. would seem to be proper.
Although the common law forms of action have been abolished, the distinction
in the two forms is still vital in the application of established rules of law based
on a distinction in trespass and trespass on the case and in construing Missouri
statutes dealing with the limitation period for trespass actions,22 magistrate court
24
jurisdiction, 23 civil penalties for trespass in the form of multiple damages and
25
criminal punishment imposed upon trespassers. Since trespass on the case and
trespass are two quite different wrongs, this case by reaffirming Missouri's position
of not properly distinguishing the two will only lead to confusion in construing
the above statutes and in applying established rules of common law.
ROBEt K. WALDO

UNFAIR COMPETITION-PALMING OFF
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. StiffelIn the years 1956-1960 the Stiffel Company had developed a substantial
market in their "pole lamps," the lamps being widely advertised in national
magazines. At this time Sears, Roebuck & Company began marketing a similar
lamp. Stiffel brought a patent infringement and unfair competition suit in the
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
1.

Id. at 5-6, 76 Pac. at 300; GouLD, WATEs § 210 (3d ed. 1900).
Rector v. Tobin Construction Co., supra note 1.
§ 516.120, RSMo 1959; see Comment, 15 Mo. L. REv. 166 (1950).
§ 517.030, RSMo 1959.
§ 49.490, RSMo 1959.
§§ 560.455-.470, 560.600, RSMo 1959.
376 U.S. 225 (1961).
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United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district
court declared the patent invalid but found the Sears lamp to have a "remarkable
sameness of appearance" and further that there was a "likelihood of confusion ...
as to the source of the lamps."2 Thus, under Illinois law, the district court found
Sears guilty of unfair competition and granted an injunction and damages. This
finding was affirmed on appeals but on certiorari, the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed.' It should be noted at this point that the district court
made no finding that there was a "palming off" of the Sears lamp as that of
Stiffel.
The Supreme Court in reversing reiterated the generality that a state, under
the law of unfair competition, cannot "set at naught" the federal policies regarding patents established under Art. I, § 8 of the United States Constitution. The
Supreme Court recognized that there could be confusion as to the manufacturer
of the product, 5 but was of the opinion that without more the copier could not
be found guilty of engaging in unfair competition. Thus Sears could not be enjoined from copying the article. The court said:
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the
copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be
patented would be to permit the State to block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the public. The result would
be that

. .

. States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lack-

ing in novelty to merit any patent at all under the federal constitutional
standards.0
After this decision the question is: how far can a state go to prevent copying
of an article under the law of unfair competition.
Here the Supreme Court denied any right to recovery because there was
nothing more than a copying with resultant confusion as to the source of the
product. 7 The Court has established that where an article is unprotected by
patent, copyright or trademark the design or appearance belongs to the publics
and any protection of that appearance or design would be to grant a monopoly
prohibited by the federal patent law. Such an article or design which is not so
protected may be slavishly copied.9
2. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963).
3. Si pra note 2.
4. Supra nete 1.
5. Id. at 232.
6. Id. at 231.
7. Id. at 232.
8. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
9. E.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., supra note 7; Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., supra note 7; Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 136 F.
Supp. 775 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd, 245 F.2d 3 (6th Cir. 1957); West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222, F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1955); Swank, Inc. v. Anson, Inc.,
104 F. Supp. 703 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 196 F.2d 330 (1st Cir. 1952); Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 586 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 136 F.2d 957 (3d Cir.
1943); James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 35 F. Supp.
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However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that when the copier is
marketing his goods in such a manner as to "palm off" these goods as those
of the original maker, the original maker will be protected under the law of unfair competition.31

In Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co. the Supreme

Court expressly acknowledged this doctrine when it stated:
Undoubtedly an unfair and fraudulent competition against the business
of the plaintiff-conducted with the intent, on the part of the defendant,
to avail itself of the reputation of the plaintiff to palm off its goods as
plaintiff's-would, in a proper case, constitute ground for relief."
This reasoning has been widely followed in granting protection under the law of
unfair competition against such imitators.12 This rule was followed in Illinois by
Stevens-Davis Co. v. Matler & Co.,1 where the court states:

The courts in this State do not treat the "palming off" doctrine as merely
the designation of a typical class of cases of unfair competition, but they
announce it as the rule of law itself-the test by which it is determined
whether a given state of facts constitutes unfair competition as a matter
of law.16
However in a later line of cases the Illinois court discarded the requirement of
palming off as a necessity for protection against such copying; the new test merely
required that there be a secondary meaning and that there be confusion in the
market place35
The above is an illustration of the general confusion in this area, viz., what
are the elements of unfair competition a state may consider in granting protection
from copying where the product is unprotected under patent, trademark or copyright laws. In some cases the courts indicate that the end sought is to protect
the public. So if the plaintiff shows that there is likely to be confusion in the
10. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118 (1905); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch
169 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 128 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1942); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917); Airstream Trailers, Inc. v. Cayo,
221 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Mich. 1963).
Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., supra note 7;
Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1893); Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537 (1891).
11. Supra note 10, at 549.
12. See generally 52 AM. JUR. Trademarks, Tradenames, and Trade Practices
86 (1944).
13. 230 Ill. App. 45 (1923).
14. Supra note 13, at 65. See also Delong Hook & Eye Co. v. Hump Hairpin
Mfg. Co., 297 Ill. 359, 369, 130 N.E. 765, 769 (1921); Chicago Directory Co. v.
Herringshaw, 187 Ill. App. 489, 499 (1914); Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton
Tripod Boiler Co., 142 Ill. 494, 30 N.E. 339 (1892).
15. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n of Chicago,
Inc., 81 F. Supp. 127 (1948); Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. Greer, 62 F. Supp. 363
(1945); Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 422, 38
N.E.2d 754, 759 (1942); Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc.,
317 Il1. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165 (1943).
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market place resulting from the copyist's actions, the plaintiff is entitled to re-

lief under the law of unfair competition.16
On the other hand the majority has'continued to require that there be a

finding of palming off. A fortiori there must also be a finding that the plaintiff's
product had developed a secondary meaning.17

If the above requirements are abolished the plaintiff only need show that
there was or will be confusion in the market place resulting from the defendant's
copying of plaintiff's product. Any restrictions on the state courts to grant relief
for such copying have then become insignificant and the constitutional grant of
exclusive jurisdiction in the Congress is in reality meaningless.
In Sears's the court of appeals upheld the trial court's findings of likelihood
of confusion and some actual confusion, findings which the appellate court construed to mean confusion as to the source of the lamp. The court of appeals
thought this enough under Illinois law to sustain the trial court's holding of unfair competition, and held Sears liable under Illinois law for doing no more than
copying and marketing an unpatented article.1 9 The Supreme Court recognized that
there could be confusion as to the manufacturer of the article but declared that
the mere inability of the public to tell the articles apart is not sufficient to grant
an injunction or damages for the copying of an article unprotected by the federal
patent laws. The Supreme Court further declared that: "Doubtless a State may, in
appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented,
be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from
being misled as to the source ... -20 There still seems to be room for the state
courts to grant relief for copying if they find something in addition to the mere
copying with the resulting confusion. However, the nature of this "something in
addition" seems to be left in doubt. The Supreme Court could have restated the
proposition that relief for copying may be granted if there is a finding of palming
off under the common law of unfair competition.21 Since there was no such finding
in this case the Court could have denied relief on that basis.
16. Nat'l Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195, 205 (9th Cir. 1955); Independent
Nail & Packing Co. v. Stronghold Screw Prod. Inc., 205 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir.
1953); J. C. Penny Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir.
1941). But see Straus v. Notaseme Co., 240 U.S. 179 (1916). In Rosaire v.
Baroid Sales Div., Nat'l Lead Co., 120 F. Supp. 20, 23 (S.D. Tex. 1954), the
court seems to imply that either palming off or likelihood of confusion with plaintiff's goods is sufficient to support a finding of unfair competition.
17. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra note 10, at 531; West Point Mfg.
Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., supra note 9, at 586; Gum, Inc., v. Gumakers of
America, Inc., supra note 9, at 960; James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire
Works, Inc., supra note 9, at 12. In Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilbom & Bishop Co.,
suprm note 9, at 301, Judge Learned Hand stated the essence of the rule when
he said: "The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiff's goods
slavishly down to the minutest detail; but he may not represent himself as the
plaintiff in their sale."
18. Supra note 2.
19. Supra note 2, at 118.

20. Supra note 1, at 232.
21. Supra note 10.
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Were it not for the language in the opinion that "because of the federal
patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted,
prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying,"22
apparently the opinion would allow state courts to continue to give relief under
the law of unfair competition upon the finding of palming off. However, the
preceding quote casts some doubt on such an interpretation. Justice Harlan, in
2
his concurring opinion in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lightitng, 3 evidently places
this construction on the majority opinion.
LARRY W. HANNAH

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY BY ACT OF GOD-THE
OBSOLESCENCE OF THE INCREASED-RISK DOCTRINE
Schmidt v. Adams & Sow Grocer Co.
Defendant was engaged in the wholesale grocery business. Plaintiff was employed by defendant to operate a truck, load, unload and deliver merchandise.
While engaged in his duties plaintiff was seriously injured by lightning.
Plaintiff was instructed by his employer to go outside to the employer's
warehouse and load groceries into a truck which was backed up to a loading
platform. While waiting for the merchandise to be ready for loading, plaintiff was
standing with one hand against the buliding and his other hand upon the truck
that he was to load. His -hand on the building was three feet from a light switch
the electrical wiring of which was not grounded. Then came a flash of lightning.
Immediately thereafter plaintiff was found staggering about holding his arm.
Persons other than the plaintiff were also standing in front of the building
when the lightning struck, but only the plaintiff was injured. An electrical engineering expert testified that the plaintiff could have been struck directly, that
the truck may have been struck, or that the building may have been struck. He
said the lightning was probably conducted into plaintiff through the building,
but, if so, that particular building was no -more likely to attract lightning than
any other building of the same height in that area. The same was testified as true
in regard to the particular truck involved. The engineer concluded that he could
think of no reason why plaintiff's employment had anything to do with the accident.
The request for workmen's compensation was denied by the court in its per
curium opinion because plaintiff had not proven that his injuries arose "out of"
his employment. The court concluded:
22. Supra note 4, at 232.
23. 376 U.S. 234, 239 (1964).
1. 377 S.W.2d 564 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
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It is not enough that plaintiff was injured while he was regularly employed. He was injured by an act of God; and, unless 'he was, by reason
of his employment, exposed to the risk of being struck by lightning to a
greater degree than was the public generally, in the same vicinity, he can
not have Workmen's Compensation for his injuries. 2
When an employee has been injured by an act of God and seeks relief
under workmen compensation statutes, most American jurisdictions follow the
increased-risk doctrine. That doctrine is: before an injury to an employee is compensable it must arise out of a hazard increased by or peculiar to employment,
and not common to the public generally.3
The reasons given by the courts for following the increased-risk rule are not
altogether clear. Evidently the courts are concerned about extending the broad
liability of employers which is created by compensation statutes. In order to curtail such an extension, they have fallen back upon the tort theory exempting
fault-free employers from liability for unforeseen injuries. It is dubious whether
the legislatures intended that the increased-risk doctrine be included in the workmen's compensation statutes. The legislatures could easily have placed such a
limitation in the statute had they so desired. Its absence indicates that such a
limitation was purposely omitted.'
One of the original purposes of the workmen's compensation statutes was to
provide relief for injuries without regard to fault or negligence. The cost of the
program was to be borne as an expense of production5 Such a program is socially
justified because it prevents a worker or his family from becoming wards of the
state. Accordingly, such statutes are liberally construed in favor of the employee. 0
The increased-risk doctrine does not follow this design.
2. Id. at 566.
3. McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913), is usually given
credit for establishing the requirement of the doctrine. See, 1 LAnsoN, THE LAW
oF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6:20 (1964).
4. Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d
511 (1945); Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind. App. 483, 504, 39
N.E.2d 499, 507 (1942):
nor is there anything in the language of the act that requires the
risk to which the employee is subjected to be different from the risk to
which the general public in the community is subjected.
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 40-1202 (1952) states:
... every employer and every employee ...
shall . . . respectively . . .
pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment.
In comparison, § 287.120 (1), RSMo 1959, states:
If both employer and employee have elected to accept the provisions of
this chapter, the employer shall be liable irrespective of negligence, to
furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment ....
5. Cohn, History of Workimen's Compensation Law, 15 V.A.M.S. 17 (1965).
See § 287.120, RSMo 1959.
6. § 287.800, RSMo 1959. The court in Clingan v. Carthage Ice & Coal
Storage Co., 223 Mo. App. 1064, 1068, 25 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (Spr. Ct. App. 1930)
states in relation to the provision for liberal construction:
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This doctrine is slowly being discarded by the courts. Some cases now hold
that "peculiar to the employment" is no longer necessary, and "not common to
the neighborhood" has received considerable criticism both in this country and
in England."
Many courts, in efforts to avoid the harshness of the increased-risk doctrine,
have allowed recovery in certain types of cases, such as heat prostration, involving
injuries caused 'byacts of God.9 Consequently, a considerable number of law review writers have been critical of applying the increased-risk doctrine to lightning
cases but omitting it in heat prostration cases 1 0
Another anomaly has arisen from courts attempting to circumvent a doctrine
which they realize is inequitable. A distinction has been made as to whether
lightning is an indirect or a direct cause of injury. Relief has been granted in the
former but denied in the latter.31
Other dissatisfied courts have avoided the increased-risk doctrine by taking
That means that the intent and purpose of the act shall not be frustrated
by interpolating, by construction, provisions which are not written therein
that will affect the rights of the parties.
7. Eagle River Bldg. & Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 199 Wis. 192,
225 N.W. 690 (1929) (an injury from, freezing). Also see Schroeder & Daly Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 169 Wis. 567, 173 N.W. 328 (1919). In which the doctrine
is seriously restricted.
8. Mixon v. Kalman, 133 N.J.L. 113, 116, 42 A.2d 309, 311 (1945): "It
is not a conclusive test that the danger is common to all, whether in or out of
the employment. A risk incident to the performance of the servant's work may
include a risk common to all mankind." Martin v. Plaut, 293 N.Y. 617, 59 N.E.2d
429 (1944). Eagle River Bldg. & Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 7
at 196, 225 N.W. at 691: "It makes no difference that the exposure was common
to all out of door employments in that locality in that kind of weather." Craig v.
Dover Nay. Co., Ltd., [1939] 4 All E. R. 558 (H.L.), reaffirming the rejection of
the increased-risk doctrine and the adoption of the positional-risk doctrine in Lawrence v. Mathews, [1929] 1 K. B. 1.
9. Horovitz, The Litigous Phrase: "Arising out of" Employment, 3 NACCA
L. J. 15, 51 (1949): "The great weight of authority now compensates for heat
prostration without proof of increased hazard, and whether due to unusual conditions or not." See, e.g., Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d
961 (1945).
10. Horovitz, supra note 9, at 51: "There is no adequate reason for preferring
those injured by nature's sun or heat, over those injured by nature's lightning,
winds or other phenomena."
11. Stout v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 289 Ky. 736, 740-41, 160 S.W.2d 31, 33
(1942):
It may be admitted that there is some conflict in the decisions of the
courts, but the great majority (with practically unanimity) permits the
recovery of compensation under workmen's compensation statutes by those
injured by lightning if the current of the stroke is aided or assisted in
any manner to seek out and land upon the injured servant where he is
directed to and is engaged in his work.
In Van Kirk v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 226 Mo. App. 1137, 49 S.W.2d
631 (K.C. Ct. App. 1932) compensation was granted where the deceased was
killed when coming into contact with a cable in water in which he was standing
that had become electrically charged when lightning struck it. See, 6 ScHNaimD,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 94 (permanent ed. 1948).
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judicial notice that the employee's occupation did increase his risk of being
injured.12
Considering the gymnastics in which courts have indulged to avoid the
harshness of the increased-risk doctrine, perhaps a more appropriate method
for reaching the desired -result (in a more logical manner) would be to abandon
the rule and adopt either the actual-risk or the positional-risk doctrine.
The actual-risk doctrine provides that whether a risk was common to people
in general is immaterial. The determinative factor is whether it was a risk of the
employment.13
Several other courts have accepted the argument proposed by the advocates
of the positional-risk theory. That theory states that an injury is one arising out
of the employment if it would not have occurred had not the employment required the claimant to be in the position where he was when injured. 14
New York courts have adopted the actual-risk rule. In Katz v. Kadans & Co.,
the court rejected the increased-risk doctrine in favor of the actual-risk doctrine.
There, the claimant, a dairyman's chauffeur, was stabbed by an insane man.
Subsequently, in Giovine v. United Hebrew Cemetery,' ° the court applied that

test where an employee was struck by lightning while digging a grave. The court
17
noted that "[hlis employment exposed him to the hazard."
Colorado adopted the positional-risk theory in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comve'n.1 In that case, the deceased, a farm hand, was killed by lightning
while returning from the farm of his employer's neighbor with a team of horses.
He was crossing a high, rocky hill near a wire fence when he and his horses were
struck. The court held that there was a relationship between the employment and
the accident since the deceased's employment required him to be in the position
he was when struck by the lightning. 19
In E. I. DuPont de Nemours Co. v. Deltn,20 the Indiana Appellate Court
12. See, e.g., Buhrkuhl v. O'Dell Constr. Co., 232 Mo. App. 967, 95 S.W.2d
843 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936) (in an isolated barn); Chiulla de Luca v. Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 107 Adt. 611 (1919) (under a wet tree); Bauer's Case,
314 Mass. 4, 49 N.E.2d 118 (1943) (under electric light in building on highest
hill); Truck Ins. Exchange v. Industrial Acci. Comm'n., 77 Cal. App.2d 461, 175
P.2d 884 (1946)

(while on a wet roof).

13. Hughes v. St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927);
Eagle River Building & Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 7. See, Larson,
supra note 3, § 6:30.
14. Larson, supra note 3, § 6:40.
15. 232 N.Y. 420, 134 N.E. 330 (1922).
16. 263 A.D. 772, 30 N.Y.2d 929 (1941).
17. Id., at 772, 30 N.Y.2d, at 930.
18. 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927).
19. Id., at 236, 254 Pac., at 996. Burke, C.J., concurring specially said:
An affirmance of this judgment establishes the rule that when one in the
course of his employment is reasonably required to be at a particular place
at a particular time and there meets with an accident, although one which
any other person then and there present would have met with irrespective
of his employment, that accident is one "arising out of" the employment of the person so injured.
20. 75 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. App. 1947).
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abandoned the increased-risk doctrine in favor of the positional-risk theory. The
decedent in that case was struck by lightning in the course of his employment. He
was crossing a transfer platform while on his way to shelter in the midst of
2
threatening weather. '
The decedent in the case of Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 2 2 was
killed when a building in which he was working was demolished by a tornado.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in adopting the positional-risk theory said:
In determining, therefore, whether an accident "arose out of" the employment, it is necessary to consider only this: (1) was the employee
then engaged about his employer's business and not merely pursuiag his
own business or pleasure; and (2) did the necessities of that employer's
business reasonably require that the employee
be at the place of the
28
accident at the time the accident occurred?
The Harvey case does not involve an injury caused by lightning. It would,
however, be inconsistent for a court to apply the increased-risk doctrine in a
24
lightning-injury case while ignoring it in a tornado-injury case.
For injuries sustained while traveling streets and highways the courts
formerly required a showing of an increased risk and that the risk was not peculiar
to the public. This rule has now been abandoned by the courts. Today, what has
c6me to -be known as the street-risk doctrine is really the actual-risk theory. It
is now the majority position taken by the states. If the employment causes the employee to use the streot, the risks of the street are the risks of the employment.25
The objectionability of the increased-risk doctrine is evident from the manner it has 'been treated by the courts. The conspicuous absence of "increasedrisk" language from the workmen's compensation statute demands that employees
be treated more liberally. A half-century spent following a doctrine does not justify the injustice which flows from its application. Proper application of the workmen's compensation statutes demands that workmen injured by acts of God in the
21. The effect of this decision was weakened when on appeal the Supreme
Court of Indiana in E. L. DuPont de Nemours Co. v. Lilly, 226 Ind. 267, 79
N.E.2d 387 (1948), chose to affirm the decision on the basis that an increased
danger could be found. Significantly, however, the court did not repudiate the
positional-risk theory and even cited Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Dehn, supra,
note 4, an unexplained-fall case, which had. adopted the doctrine.
22. 199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942).
23. Id. at 729-30, 6 So.2d at 750. The court here quoting the test which
it had laid down in Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La. 432, 438, 141 So. 19, 21 (1932),
in which an employee had been struck by an automobile while returning from an
errand upon which he had been sent by his employer.
24. See notes 9 and 10 suspra.
25. The court in Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co., 325 Mo. 677, 683,
29 S.W.2d 128, 130-31 (1930), said:
...
the Legislature, in our opinion, intended to extend the protection of
the law to all employees while in or about any premises where they may
be engaged in the performance of their duties, and while at any place
where their services, or any act, task or mission which forms a necessary
part of their services, may reasonably require them to -be.
See also: O'Neil v. Fred Evens Motor Sales Co., 160 S.W.2d 775 (St. L. Mo. App.
1942); Larson, supra note 3, at 75-82.
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course of their employment receive their due remuneration without being deprived
therefrom by this "relic of the common law theory of liability based on fault,
26
the very theory which the compensation laws attempted to abolish."
EARL BovD

26. 24 IND. Lj. 468, 473 (1949).
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